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In the past few years, an increasing number of Private Security Companies (PSCs – also 
sometimes referred to as Private Military Companies, PMCs2) has emerged and is offering 
and conducting maritime security services in Southeast Asia.3 These companies offer services 
in addition to security provided by Southeast Asian states and their government agencies. This 
paper explores the role of private companies in securing vessels, ports, offshore energy 
installations and fishing grounds across Southeast Asia, and discusses whether or not PSCs 
are an alternative or viable supplement to government efforts to protect national waters, 
shipping lanes and other maritime assets.  
Initially, the paper explains why the maritime environment is of such importance in 
Southeast Asia and gives an overview of possible threats to maritime security. It then reviews 
the current security arrangements in place in the region, looking at resources of government 
law enforcement agencies, the controversial nature of some of their operations, and outlines 
regional cooperation in place to combat crime and other maritime security threats. The paper 
then describes the emergence of private companies operating in the maritime sector in 
Southeast Asia, details the different types of services they offer and briefly discusses the 
factors which have led to the growth of PSCs offering maritime services in recent years. It 
then explores the role played by PSCs today and their impact within and beyond Southeast 
Asia and discusses problems and concerns about PSCs and the maritime services they offer. 
The paper concludes by comparing the benefits and shortcomings of the work conducted by 
PSCs with efforts made by governments in the region to secure the oceans, arguing that both 
private as well as government initiatives can be problematic and need improvement in order 
to offer the best possible answer to maritime security threats in Southeast Asia.   
 
 
MARITIME SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THREATS TO SECURITY  
Southeast Asia is home to important sea-lanes and straits, including the Malacca Straits, one 
of the busiest waterways in the world. More than 50,000 vessels on international routes transit 
the Malacca Straits each year, which connects the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea. 
Tankers carrying oil from the Middle East to countries such as China and Japan, which rely 
on imported oil, are just some of the vessels passing through the straits each day. Some of the 
world’s busiest ports are also located in Southeast Asia or rely on maritime traffic through the 
region’s waters. Singapore harbour, for instance, has the largest container turnover rate in the 
world after Hong Kong, followed by the Chinese ports of Shanghai and Shenzhen. Many of 
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the ships bound for these ports, or other major East and Southeast Asian ports, transit 
Southeast Asian waters. Additionally, many other vessels, including fishing boats, passenger 
vessels, and pleasure craft ply the region’s waters.4  
Southeast Asia is also rich in gas, oil and mineral resources and both onshore and 
offshore energy installations are operating in many countries in the region. Companies 
extracting oil, gas or other natural resources depend on offshore platforms or terminals along 
the coast from which the extracted goods are shipped to various destinations around the 
world. A large number of those mining sites and oil/gas fields in Southeast Asia are located in 
economically underdeveloped or politically volatile areas, some with ongoing armed conflict. 
The exploitation of these fields is therefore only possible with efficient security arrangements 
in place. Theft, as well as protest or sabotage by local residents demanding compensation for 
pollution and damage to land and livelihood, or a share of the profits made from the 
exploitation of the resources for local community development, can pose a security threat for 
oil/gas and mining companies operating in the region. Indeed, there are a number of examples 
of local resistance and violence against companies, including the protests against Unocal in 
East Kalimantan, where locals demonstrated against the pollution of their seas and demanded 
payment of compensation money. In 2000, the conflict eventually resulted in violence. 
However, not only installations but also the employees of oil/gas or mining companies are at 
risk. An example is the kidnapping of three employees of the British company Premier Oil in 
East Java in 2000/1 by local residents, following concerns that the company’s operations 
would endanger the environment and cause losses for fishers and farmers because the 
exploration site was located too close to the shore.5 Additionally, as in other parts of the 
world, accidents and natural disasters pose a threat for the maritime and offshore energy 
industry. However, many security risks in Southeast Asia are a result of the activities of 
criminals, terrorists and separatist movements operating in the region.6  
Criminal activities at sea in Southeast Asia include illegal fishing, smuggling of goods 
and people, fraud and piracy. With the introduction of the concept of a 200 nautical mile 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 1982 and the increasing problem of over fishing in parts 
of the region, illegal fishing has become a security concern and has resulted in conflict 
between local and foreign fishers and the loss of revenue for affected local fishermen and 
their home countries.7 Smuggling of people, wildlife and valuable goods, such as cigarettes, 
weapons and alcohol, on small, medium sized and large vessels is also a security concern in 
Asia, particularly since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, as arms or components of 
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weapons, including weapons of mass destruction for terrorist organizations, can be 
transported illegally by sea.   
More important in regard to the work conducted by PSCs in the maritime sector in 
Southeast Asia is perhaps at present, fraud and maritime piracy. Fraud – or theft by deception 
– in the maritime sector includes various types of activities such as insurance fraud, document 
fraud and container fraud, to mention but a few. In cases involving fraud, one party falls 
victim to a deception, often trusting forged documents, and thus hands over money or goods 
willingly to the fraudster.8 Ensuing financial losses can be substantial as entire vessels or 
cargos can go ‘missing’, or a seemingly valuable cargo can consist of poor quality goods. 
Given the importance and scale of maritime trade in Southeast Asia, fraud is a major concern 
for local merchants as well as traders from outside the region, ship and cargo owners and 
insurance companies.  
Southeast Asia has since the late 1980s also become one of the global `hot spots´ of 
pirate attacks on commercial vessels and fishing boats. Modern day pirates are increasingly 
prepared to use violence to further their aims, with the number of pirates armed with 
automatic weapons on the rise and injuries to the crew, assaults, and killings occurring 
regularly in pirate attacks in the region. A further worry is the latest increase in hostage taking 
of crewmembers and vessels for ransom.9 While the vast majority of pirate attacks in 
Southeast Asia today are simple ‘hit and run robberies’, committed by what can best be 
described as ‘common sea-robbers’, some attacks are conducted by organised pirate gangs –  
or syndicates – who predominantly attack medium-sized vessels, including cargo ships, bulk 
carriers and tankers. In these cases a vessel and its crew is held hostage for a limited time, or 
the entire vessel is hijacked by pirates and is then turned into a ‘phantom ship’.10  
Separatist groups and terrorists also pose a threat to vessels, ports and offshore energy 
installations in Southeast Asia. Volatile political environments in which separatists and 
terrorists operate can pose a threat to maritime security in two different ways. First, the 
disruption of the local economy by armed conflict (such as in southern Thailand at present) 
can increase the crime rate and may result in a rising number of pirate attacks on vessels at 
sea or in ports and can also cause problems, in the form of local unrest, for companies in the 
energy or mining sector operating in the area. Second, separatists or terrorists can target 
maritime facilities directly. In the Indonesian province of Aceh on the northern tip of 
Sumatra, for example, where offshore energy installations are located, the Free Aceh 
Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) has been involved in a struggle for independence 
for several decades and has reportedly conducted maritime attacks and has launched 
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offensives against foreign companies operating in the area, including Exxon Mobil and their 
supply vessels. Indeed, in 2001 the attacks against Exxon Mobil employees in Aceh were so 
severe that the company was forced to close its operations for four months.11 In the southern 
Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf (AS) are active 
and have been involved in maritime attacks, including the bombing of the SuperFerry 14 in 
February 2004 by AS members in which more than 100 people lost their lives.12 Other radical 
groups such as the Indonesian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and international terrorist 
organizations such as al-Qaeda may also have the potential to conduct attacks on maritime 
targets throughout Southeast Asia.13 Furthermore, to operate successfully, terrorist and 
separatist groups require modern weapons, and the activities of such organizations in 
Southeast Asia have therefore intensified the illegal trade in arms and small weapons for the 
past several decades. In some parts of the region, such as the southern Philippines, weapons 
are today readily available to terrorists, separatists, crime syndicates and pirates alike.         
 
SECURING MARITIME SOUTHEAST ASIA – GOVERNMENT RESPONSES 
Southeast Asian countries have, unlike other countries in which PSCs operate, comparatively 
stable governments and have in recent decades gone through a process of rapid economic 
development. Due to their economic success in the first half of the 1990s, Southeast Asian 
countries were able to expand and modernise their defence forces, including their naval 
capabilities. The ‘upgrading’ of naval forces was triggered by concerns such as overlapping 
claims of ownership of islands and ocean areas, the importance of maritime trade and a 
growing desire to become more self reliant in terms of maritime security.14 To address these 
challenges, local governments have acquired more sophisticated vessels, aircrafts and 
weapons, capable of operating over longer distances and wider ranges than earlier models.15 
While military spending varied between countries in Southeast Asia, with the Philippines 
spending considerably less on their naval forces than Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Singapore, the scale of purchases of new, and the modernisation of old, naval equipment in 
the region triggered fears of a naval arms race in Southeast Asia by the mid 1990s.16 
However, as Bateman pointed out in 1996, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia remained only 
medium maritime powers despite the modernisation programs.17 Even in comparison to the 
naval forces of neighbouring countries, such as Japan and China, the naval capabilities of 
Southeast Asian forces remained moderate.18  
In 1997, the expansion and modernisation of the military forces in Southeast Asia 
slowed down due to the Asian financial crisis, which affected the economies of all countries 
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in the region, but particularly those of Thailand, Indonesia, and to a lesser degree Malaysia. 
As a result of the crisis, regional states had less capital available to finance military 
modernisation programs, with equipment procurement plans being delayed, postponed or, in 
some rare cases entirely suspended. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, Indonesia, which 
suffered most from the crisis, cut back its military budget by 40 percent. Thailand also cut 
back heavily on its military spending, while Malaysia and the Philippines had to make fewer 
concessions, but were also forced to slow down or abandon some existing modernisation 
plans. Singapore, which was least affected by the crisis was, on the contrary, able to increase 
its military budget by 5 percent in 1998.19 However, most local economies, as well as military 
spending recovered within years. Indeed, concerns about the political stability of Indonesia, 
unresolved boundary disputes accelerated by increasing demand for natural resources, and 
concern about the presence of foreign powers in the region, let local governments to increase 
military spending according to resources available.20  
Furthermore, while naval forces play an important role in safeguarding national waters 
and responding to criminal activities, they share these tasks with other government agencies 
such as the coast guard and the marine police. As Simon states: 
As regional economies began to recover in 1999, several Southeast Asian militaries 
adopted a new strategy to enhance modernization. Although coping with internal 
security challenges remains an important concern, this responsibility is being 
transferred from the army to the national police. Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia are 
making this transition. Even Indonesia, whose military remains embroiled in domestic 
upheavals, plan to transfer internal security responsibilities to the police as the internal 
situation warrants.21
 
Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, a number of countries in Southeast Asia have 
established coast guards and/or other maritime agencies to allow their navies to focus more on 
defence and war-fighting abilities. While the Philippines have a long established coast guard, 
Singapore and Malaysia have set-up coast guards and other maritime agencies in more recent 
years. In Indonesia, about 10 agencies are involved in providing maritime security, with the 
navy still largely responsible for law enforcement at sea.22  
 
Capabilities and Problems 
Given the different resources available to military and law enforcement agencies in the 
various Southeast Asian countries, their capabilities to protect their respective national waters 
vary. Singapore, for example, has invested heavily in its naval forces, including the coast 
guard, and the limited size of the country’s national waters makes them easier to secure than 
the waters of  neighbouring countries. Consequently, Singapore waters enjoy the reputation of 
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being safe and only very few criminal incidents are reported from Singapore waters and the 
city-state’s port.  
Malaysia was also able to substantially increase its naval capabilities in recent years. 
Seven agencies are involved in protecting Malaysian waters, namely the Royal Malaysian 
Police (Marine), the Royal Customs and Excise Department, the Marine Department, the 
Fishery Department, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN), the Department of Environment, and 
the Immigration Department. Generally speaking, the RMN and the Royal Malaysian Air 
Force are responsible for the protection of Malaysia’s EEZs, while the other agencies are 
responsible for different operations and tasks in the country’s territorial waters.23 As this large 
number of agencies responsible for maritime security led to coordination problems, the 
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) was established in 2005 to coordinate 
activities and to actively protect Malaysian waters.24 In addition to the establishment of these 
new agencies, Malaysia also set-up new naval bases while similarly enhancing the capabilities 
of the marine police in areas of heightened security concern, such as the waters between 
Sabah and the southern Philippines.25 Despite the modernisation of maritime agencies, it 
remains difficult to secure Malaysian waters and corruption is a problem among some 
Malaysian officers. Local fisherman along the Malacca Straits and Sabah, for example, claim 
that Malaysian Marine Police officers regularly harass local fishers and demand money or fish 
from them.26 Even senior Malaysian police officers working along the Malacca Straits 
acknowledge that some officers may be corrupt or involved in illegal activities, stating that a 
number of pirate victims do not report attacks, as they are “afraid of acts of revenge as they 
believe, or know, that law enforcement agencies are themselves involved in illegal 
activities.”27 However, compared to the situation in Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, 
corruption is a less serious concern in Malaysia.  
Indeed, the naval authorities of Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia are faced with 
more substantial problems. Being affected heavily by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Thai 
navy is still struggling to address security requirements in its national waters. Furthermore, 
members of the military and police in Thailand are also actively involved in illegal activities 
such as the trade in illegal drugs and in the sale of arms to criminals and minority groups in 
Myanmar.28 The Philippine naval authorities encounter similar problems. Despite some 
modernisation, the Philippine navy is considered the weakest in Southeast Asia.29 The 
Philippine Navy, Coast Guard and other law enforcement agencies have consequently only 
limited resources available to secure the vast archipelagic waters of the country. The 
Philippine National Security Advisor Noberto Gonzales, for example, stated in 2006: 
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We cannot watch and check every boat that travels between Indonesia and Mindanao. 
Over 26,000 trips are made by these boats and it is impossible to monitor each of them 
given the government’s meagre resources (…). How do you expect government to 
tightly watch its territorial waters when we lack the necessary equipment and vessels 
to patrol our borders with Indonesia.30  
This lack of patrol craft and other resources affects all waters under Philippine jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the Philippine Navy and other law enforcement agencies are known for 
corruption, including the sale of firearms to civilians or members of separatist movements and 
the acceptance of bribes.31 Corruption combined with a lack of resources leave criminals as 
well as politically motivated groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu 
Sayyaf ample opportunities to operate in Philippine waters and travel with ease between the 
Philippines and neighbouring countries.       
Of particular importance are the naval authorities of Indonesia. The country’s national 
waters are the largest in Southeast Asia, consisting of three million square km of archipelagic 
and territorial waters and a further three million square km of EEZ and continental shelf. 
Given its geographical features, the country is home to numerous ports as well as important 
sea-lanes, including parts of the Malacca Straits. Indonesian waters are also rich in gas and oil 
and exploitation of these resources is taking place in different parts of the country. Given the 
size and importance of Indonesian waters and the many controversies surrounding the 
working practices of the Indonesian military (TNI) and police, they will receive particular 
attention here.   
Ten different agencies are responsible for law enforcement and security at sea in 
Indonesia. The different roles of these agencies has, however, not been sufficiently clarified 
and the coordination of their activities has been difficult, despite the establishment of 
Bakorkamla, the coordination agency for security at sea, under the command of the 
Commander of the Armed Forces. In the past, the police and military operated under one 
umbrella, but in 1999 they were separated and their tasks more clearly divided, with the police 
accepting greater responsibility for internal security. In theory, the TNI is now primarily 
responsible for national security, while the police (in conjunction with other agencies) is 
responsible for law enforcement within Indonesia. In practice, however, these divisions are 
less clear-cut and the navy is still largely responsible for law enforcement at sea.32 Yet, the 
navy has only limited resources available to secure Indonesian waters and ports, with the 
Indonesian fleet consisting of around 115 boats of different sizes of which only about 25 are 
operational at any given time.33 The Indonesian marine police faces similar problems, with an 
insufficient number of operational vessels available. The comparatively low military budget 
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(and funding for the police), particular after the Asian crisis, is largely responsible for the lack 
of resources available. In fact, government officials have claimed in the past that only 25-30 
percent of the military’s expenditure is covered by the military budget, while in 2005 an 
estimated 50 percent of military costs were covered by the budget.34 To compensate for the 
lack of government funding, the Indonesian military and police are involved in commercial 
ventures, own their own businesses and are partners in, and provide services for, private 
enterprises.35 Other funding is derived from illegal activities, as a 2006 Human Rights Watch 
report states:  
The Indonesian military draws on off-budget (extra-budgetary and unaccountable) 
funds derived from military-owned enterprises, informal alliances with private 
entrepreneurs to whom the military often provides services, mafia-like criminal 
activity, and corruption.36                     
 
Indeed, members of the Indonesian military/navy are believed to have been involved in 
criminal activities at sea such as pirate attacks. Military, navy and police officers are also 
known to accept bribes or ‘taxes’ from criminals, crime victims or businesses operating 
within Indonesia and its waters. Fishers on the Malaysian side of the Malacca Straits have, for 
example, claimed to have paid ‘protection’ money to Indonesian authorities. Allegations of 
involvement of Indonesian officials in criminal activities and corruption are also voiced by 
owners and operators of merchant vessels, often on account of reports from crewmembers or 
personal experiences.37 One Singaporean ship manager, for example, believes that the 
Indonesian Navy is directly involved in piracy and said that his company’s vessels are 
occasionally harassed by the Indonesian Navy and money is paid to the officers. Furthermore, 
his company pays the Indonesian Navy to protect its vessels while at berth in Aceh and one of 
his company’s vessels was arrested by the Indonesian Navy on Batam for allegedly dumping 
waste into the ocean. The navy officials responsible for the arrest contacted the ship manager, 
who was told that the official procedures could take weeks or even months but offered the 
manager the alternative option of paying ‘compensation money’. The manager decided to pay 
the compensation money of Singapore $200,000 in cash and his vessel was allowed to leave 
the following day.38  
This type of corruption is common in Indonesia and is often explained by the comparatively 
low salaries army, navy and police personnel receive.39 Accepting bribes and requesting `fees´ 
are `accepted´ or at least tolerated methods of increasing incomes of officers. Involvement in 
business activities and providing services for private businesses are other practiced methods. 
The provision of security and protection services is of particular importance in this regard and 
the military and police are known to provide such services by either hiring out troops as 
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private guards or setting up their own private security companies. According to a Human 
Rights Watch Report: 
…the TNI provides security to large multinational companies. In Indonesia, 
companies that operate facilities that the government has declared to be `vital national 
assets´ are required to have protection. In practice, it has usually been the TNI that fills 
this role, despite a 2004 presidential decree that officially shifted the responsibility to 
guard such facilities to the police. For example, Indonesian authorities certified in 
January 2006 that the TNI would guard the facilities of three companies because 
neither the company nor the police could ensure adequate security.40  
 
Companies operating in the extractive sector, including companies operating (at least in part) 
in the maritime sphere, are often those paying local law enforcement agencies to guarantee the 
safety of their assets and employees. According to the Human Rights Watch Report: 
Companies can come under strong pressure to underwrite the expenses of military 
forces assigned to protect their facilities, so they do not always feel they have a choice. 
A former international executive commented to Human Rights Watch in frustration: 
`The way Indonesia sets up funding of the police and military is one grand national 
extortion racket.´41
 
Furthermore, such payments to state security forces have resulted in a number of 
controversies and problems, including accusations of corruption and human rights abuses by 
the paid agencies. An example is the disputed employment of the Indonesian military to 
protect Freeport’s42 mining operations in Indonesia’s eastern region of Papua, formerly 
known as Irian Jaya, from the 1970s onwards. The military was at the same time fighting 
against a rebellion for Papuan independence and allegations of corruption and excessive 
violence against the local population by the Indonesian military in Papua surfaced.43 Another 
example are the allegations against Exxon Mobil, of having “paid and directed government 
forces who committed atrocities while protecting the oil company’s facilities” in Aceh.44 The 
case received international attention when the International Labour Rights Fund filed charges 
under the US Alien Tort Claims Act against Exxon Mobil on behalf of 11 Acehnese who 
accused the Indonesian military guarding the oil company’s installations of murder, rape and 
the kidnapping of local residents.45   
 
Cooperation 
Given the geographic feature of Southeast Asia, many security concerns are today of a 
transnational nature, with criminals, separatists and terrorists travelling between and operating 
in more than one country. The level of cooperation between governments and law 
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enforcement agencies in Southeast Asia to secure shipping and maritime installations 
therefore also plays a role.  
During the Cold War, the divide between communist and non-communist countries in 
Southeast Asia hampered cooperation. After the Cold War, co-operation slowly increased 
between nations in the region, with former communist states such as Laos and Vietnam 
becoming increasingly integrated in Southeast Asian security initiatives.46 Also, with the 
removal of the ‘communist threat’, more attention was paid to transnational non-traditional 
security issues, and cooperation in the region consequently increasingly focused on these 
‘new’ security threats. Given its importance, the security of the Malacca Straits has been of 
international concern and the straits have been at the core of maritime security cooperation 
between countries from within and outside Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, a range of 
multilateral and bilateral agreements and other cooperative efforts to enhance maritime 
security have been implemented and discussed since 1992.47 ASEAN played a leading role in 
these efforts, with ASEAN leaders pledging in October 2003 to increase cooperation in order 
to create a ‘security community’ to combat piracy, terrorism and other transnational crimes in 
the region. ASEAN efforts to increase security have, however, been limited by ASEAN’s 
policy of non-interference in domestic affairs.48 Other multilateral agreements have also been 
implemented amidst difficulties. One example is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on 
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), an initiative initially 
introduced by Japan, which promotes the sharing of information related to piracy and the 
establishment of an Information Sharing Centre. The agreement aims at enhancing 
cooperation between 16 countries, including the ASEAN members, China, South Korea, 
Japan, Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka. Even though 13 countries have so far signed and 
ratified the agreement (or are in the process of ratifying it) Malaysia and Indonesia, two 
important countries in regard to maritime security in Southeast Asia, are not yet among them. 
Furthermore, the agreement does not “oblige members to any specific action other than 
sharing information that they deem pertinent to imminent pirate attacks”.49         
Emphasis has also been placed on bilateral cooperation and agreements between Southeast 
Asian nations. Bilateral efforts to combat maritime crime include a series of bilateral 
agreements between Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia to conduct joint exercises at sea and 
to coordinate naval patrols in the Malacca Straits. However, initiatives such as the coordinated 
patrols have been criticised as consisting of little more than an exchange of schedules.50 In 
2004, a trilateral agreement between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia was reached to 
conduct coordinated patrols (named MALSINDO) in the Malacca Straits. India and Thailand 
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have both expressed interest in joining the patrols, an offer which has so far not been taken 
up. However, two years later combined coordinated air patrols over the Malacca Straits, 
named Eye in the Sky (EiS), were introduced. The three littoral states together with Thailand 
agreed that initially each state should conduct up to two air patrols a week.51 In April 2006, 
the MALSINDO and EiS initiatives were brought together under the umbrella of the Malacca 
Straits Patrol Network.52 Yet, despite initial success, these coordinated air and sea patrols 
have so far failed to significantly reduce criminal activity in the straits. Indeed, particularly 
the EiS program has been widely criticised for the low number of actual flights taking place 
and the limited resources available to respond to incidents spotted from the surveillance 
planes.53 The level and the nature of cooperation between the countries concerned is one 
important factor determining the outcome of the sea and air patrols. Concerns over national 
sovereignty, and the question of allowing law enforcement agencies from neighbouring 
countries access to national waters, has so far prevented closer cooperation in the region. 
While the surveillance planes are allowed to fly for up to three nautical miles into the 
territorial waters of the participating states, the naval patrols remain coordinated, rather than 
joined patrols, meaning that `hot-pursuit´ into, or patrolling of waters of neighbouring 
countries, is not permitted.54               
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Countries from outside Southeast Asia, such as Japan, China, India, Australia and the 
USA have also expressed interested in playing a role in securing the Malacca Straits and other 
Southeast Asian shipping lanes and have offered assistance to complement indigenous 
security efforts. Yet, their active involvement in securing the regions waters has mostly been 
met with scepticism. For example, despite ambitions from these countries to actively 
contribute to the security of the Malacca Straits, Indonesia and Malaysia have so-far rejected 
the idea of foreign military forces patrolling or being stationed in their country’s waters.55 
Sensitivities about sovereignty are often cited as the main reason behind this refusal.56 Other 
factors include fear that military cooperation may expose domestic inadequacies, increased 
importance of offshore economic resources, and overlapping claims of ownership of islands 
or sea areas which are located in strategic places or are believed to be resource rich.57 
Additionally, rivalry between external countries such as the US and China or China and India 
have had an impact on the level of cooperation.  
All these factors have so far prevented Southeast Asian countries from cooperating 
more closely together and with nations from outside the region. This limited cooperation 
between countries has a direct impacting on maritime security in the region, as criminals or 
terrorists, for example, can operate across borders with greater ease.  
In summary, the limited resources of some local law enforcement agencies in 
Southeast Asia combined with corruption, and other problems within some law enforcement 
agencies in the region, as well as limited cooperation between states, opened the door for a 
rising number of private companies offering maritime security services in maritime Southeast 
Asia.   
 
PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES IN MARITIME SOUTHEAST ASIA  
Private companies offering maritime services are not new to the region. A number of 
companies that are active today have been working in the maritime security business in the 
region for decades. An example is Glenn Defense Marine (Asia), which was established in 
1946 and has offices in Singapore, Hong Kong, Indonesia and other countries in Asia. 
However, the majority of companies presently operating in the maritime sector in Southeast 
Asia emerged after the end of the Cold War, with their number increasing sharply after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. While these companies are part of the worldwide 
process of privatisation of military and security services, they also emerged in answer to 
changes in the (maritime) security environment in Southeast Asia, which created a crucial 
niche for PSCs to offer an increasing range of maritime security services. Indeed, while 
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terrorism, separatism, as well as fraud, piracy and other criminal activities have existed in 
Southeast Asia for decades, perception of maritime security changed with the end of the Cold 
War as more importance was placed on non-traditional security issues. However, it was the 
September 11 terrorist attacks in the US and triggered the implementation of new security 
measures affecting waters and ports in Southeast Asia. With a heightened fear of a major 
maritime terrorist attack, governments began to look at the world’s oceans with grave 
concern, resulting in the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
Code (ISPS) and other new safety and security regulations in the maritime sector. This also 
heightened security consciousness in the shipping and offshore energy industry, with many 
becoming aware that security improvements were necessary to adequately protect their assets, 
investments and employees. Nevertheless, there has been widespread concern about whether 
or not the implementation of the ISPS code and other new regulations will substantially 
increase maritime security, with many observers arguing that while everything looks good on 
paper, in reality nothing will change.58 Even if the new regulations were to prove successful, 
the maritime environment would still remain one of the least regulated sectors – a legacy of 
the old maritime tradition of the freedom of the seas. This continuing lack of effective control 
leaves ample opportunity for illegal activities and the emergence of grey-zones, thus 
providing criminals and terrorists with space to conduct their operations.  
With the heightened concern about maritime security, the demand for services addressing the 
various security threats increased. Yet, government authorities and agencies are often unable 
to provide security, training, and technical security equipment on the scale that is sought by 
the maritime industry since September 11, or is required today as part of new security 
regulations, such as the ISPS code. As a result, a growing number of PSCs emerged offering a 
wide range of maritime security services. Many PSCs offering maritime security in the 
Southeast Asian region are part of, or linked to, either larger PSCs or transnational 
corporations outside the security industry. While many of the larger companies that operate in 
Southeast Asia are based in the US and Great Britain,59 a number of them have in recent years 
established branch offices in the Asian region. One example is Hart, which has opened an 
office in Singapore. Moreover, a number of smaller companies have been established in the 
region, such as Background Asia, with headquarters also in Singapore. Many companies 
active in maritime Southeast Asia only consist of a limited number of permanent staff, an 
office and, usually, an impressive presence on the Internet. These companies hire additional 
personnel and acquire necessary equipment on a case-by-case basis, once a contract with a 
client is signed, which allows the companies to run their business with limited expenses and 
 13
capital. While this type of company set-up can be beneficial for a client – as resources are 
bought and staff hired specifically for the client’s needs – it also allows companies to rapidly 
dissolve and recreate themselves if need be.60 Also, it allows the establishment of PSCs by a 
wide variety of people. 
Information provided by companies about their background, the company itself and 
the services they have conducted in the past, as well as information about the people they hire 
if required, is usually sparse. The majority of PSCs operating in the maritime sector seem to 
be founded and staffed by ex-military or ex-law enforcement personnel, with the credentials 
and reputation of the company often linked to the past military experiences of its founding 
members and employees. Therefore, most companies advertise to employ former members of 
elite Special Forces from around the globe, with `vast experience´. Whether or not this 
experience is in the maritime sector or related to the services and tasks they are now 
employed for by the company – including for example knowledge about the vulnerabilities of 
a ship or oil rig – is often unclear. 
While some companies specialize in the protection of specific assets, such as the London 
based company Yacht-Secure Ltd, most companies offer services for different types of 
facilities focusing largely on the protection of ports, underwater assets, offshore energy 
installations and their supply chains, fishing grounds and a large variety of vessels, including 
(slow moving) commercial vessels, large fishing boats, cruise ships, tugs and navy vessels 
visiting foreign ports. In order to guarantee the safety of these, often foreign, assets a large 
variety of specific services are offered by PSCs, ranging from risk assessment to crisis 
management.61 While not all companies offer all services, almost every company offers 
assistance with security plans and risk analysis consulting services, either consisting of 
general political risk reports published and updated regularly, or client-specific risk 
assessments. Most companies, however, also offer more active services which can be divided 
into two categories. The first category is comprised of services aimed at the prevention of 
attacks. These include the tracking of commercial vessels, protection of fishing grounds, 
guarding of offshore energy installations or ports, the employment of plain-clothed PSC 
personnel or (un)armed guards on ships or on noticeable escort vessels, as well as the training 
of seafarers and law enforcement and military personnel. The second category of services 
focuses on crisis and post-attack/incident response. Services include the investigation and 
recovery of hijacked or missing vessels and stolen cargoes, negotiation in cases of kidnapped 
crew or employees, hostage rescue after negotiations have failed and first aid and evacuation 
assistance in emergencies or accidents. Overall, the services offered address threats posed by 
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smugglers, fraudsters, pirates, and terrorists and prepare companies for accidents or natural 
hazards. 
 
PSCs: Role, Impact and Controversies 
The role played by PSCs in maritime Southeast Asia and their impact is twofold. First, a 
number of companies have provided services that are in the broader sense in the realm of 
militaries and local law enforcement agencies. Work completed includes, for instance, anti-
piracy services in the Malacca Straits, with Background Asia having escorted tankers62 and 
the Australian based PSC Counter Terrorism International (CTI) providing protection for a 
vessel, which departed from an oil rig and travelled through the Malacca Straits.63 In regard to 
protection of energy installations, Group 4 was reportedly hired to manage security issues for 
the US based oil company Caltex Pacific Indonesia for their operations in Riau Province, 
Sumatra.64 Second, statements, reports and risk assessments produced by PSCs have an 
increasing impact on decision-making processes of governments and businesses, as well as 
the formation of opinion in the public sector. A rising number of PSC personnel, for example, 
participate in conferences concerned with maritime security issues. Furthermore, outcomes of 
PSC reports now regularly find their way into the mainstream media and shape public 
perception of maritime security issues. 
There are some practical, ethical, technical and legal problems associated with a 
number of maritime security services conducted by PSCs, in relation to both, the active 
services performed by PSCs and their impact on perception of security threats. For example, 
as mentioned earlier, on occasion, oil/gas or mining companies have relied on local state law 
enforcement agencies to protect their assets and employees. If these companies hired foreign 
PSCs, problems with local forces could emerge. Therefore good local contacts are crucial for 
PSCs operating in Southeast Asia and the companies (not only for this reason) need to comply 
with the laws and regulations set by the states in which they operate. This can be a complex 
task, especially when commercial vessels are protected by PSCs, as a vessel not only moves 
between various states and jurisdictions, using the right of innocent passage, but also usually 
sails under the flag of yet another state. Furthermore, some governments are concerned about 
a range of services offered by PSCs, which are designed to be conducted in regional waters, 
including territorial waters and EEZs. For example, a number of companies offer armed escort 
vessels for shipping in high-risk areas and piracy hotspots, such as the Malacca Straits. The 
publication of a handful of newspaper articles in the Straits Times,65 describing these services 
sparked an outcry from Malaysian and Indonesian authorities. Both countries rejected the 
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employment of private armed escorts in their national waters, with the Malaysian Director of 
Internal Security and Public Order, Datuk Othman Talib, warning that any such vessel found 
in Malaysian waters would be detained and the crew arrested as either terrorists or 
mercenaries. They would then subsequently be charged under the Internal Security Act. He 
also pointed out that any PSC wishing to operate in Malaysian waters has to apply for 
permission from the Ministry of Internal Security.66 In a 2006 conference paper, Capt. Noor 
Apandi Osnin from the Maritime Institute of Malaysia stated that so far no licenses have been 
issued to PSCs to operate in Malaysian waters. He further commented that armed PSC escort 
vessels “can be viewed as impinging on the States sovereignty” and their activities, licensed 
or unlicensed, may set a historical precedent for other “foreign forces (…) to enter and control 
the Strait.”67  
When asked about their operations in the Malacca Straits, PSC employees from 
various companies have stated in interviews with the author that in most cases the Indonesian 
and/or Malaysian authorities are informed about planned operations, either through a liaison 
officer or a personal contact. In the process money changes hands and the company receives 
‘permission’ to conduct its work, even though not always in writing. Whether these 
‘permissions’ to operate in Indonesian or Malaysian waters are the same as official permits, 
such as mentioned by Datuk Othman Talib, is questionable. The core problem in the debate as 
to whether or not PSCs are allowed to operate within Southeast Asian countries or their 
respective territorial waters or EEZs, is the fact that PSCs conduct work that sometimes 
requires their employees to carry firearms. Rules and regulations regarding the bearing and 
use of weapons by private companies vary from country to country. It is, for example, very 
difficult, if not impossible, for a PSC to receive permission for their employees to carry 
firearms in Singapore, despite the fact that some companies have their headquarters or offices 
based in the city-state.68 Hence, employees of Background Asia, for example, are required to 
disassemble their weapons and lock the ammunition magazines and firing pins in separate 
locations when in Singapore waters.69 However, apart from applying for permits to employ 
armed personnel in other countries of the region, there are other ways for PSCs to conduct 
armed services. CTI, for example, occasionally employs staff from local security companies. 
The locals hired not only have the required permission to operate in the country, but may also 
have additional local knowledge.70
The use of armed guards, however, cannot only pose a problem in the legal sense and 
the choice of which security company to employ is crucial for potential clients. A ship owner 
or an oil/gas company, for example, has to trust a PSC to choose the right kind of people to be 
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employed as armed guards on one of their oil rigs or vessels in order to avoid accidents and 
excessive use of violence. Representatives of the Federation of ASEAN Shipowners’ 
Association, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and various other maritime 
organizations have pointed out that armed escorts may, in fact, escalate an already volatile 
situation and that a shoot-out on an oil or chemical tanker could prove disastrous.71 Also, 
when protecting smaller vessels, including yachts, it is important to hire guards who will use 
their weapons carefully. The use of guns may not always be necessary, particularly in 
incidences in which local fishermen simply approach the protected vessel out of curiosity 
without any malicious intent. However, extreme actions on the side of PSCs are possible and 
remain unaccounted for, as they will most likely occur at sea and out of sight of authorities or 
witnesses. Indeed, the question of the level of violence used by PSCs remains ambiguous, if 
not controversial. However, it is understood that if PSC employees carry guns, they are also 
prepared to use them, or as Alex Duperouzel from Background Asia explained in a newspaper 
interview: „Just like a cop who has to defend his own life, our men will not shoot to kill. It is 
a series of escalating events. If we can take out an engine, we’ll do so. We will also go for the 
knees. But if we are forced to engage, we will engage to win.”72
The role played by PSCs in shaping the perception of maritime security issues in 
Southeast Asia is also in some cases problematic.73 For example, media articles based on PSC 
reports can be of concern as the actual reports are mostly confidential or extremely costly. It is 
therefore often difficult, if not outright impossible, for outsiders to receive more detailed 
information about findings and assessments or to determine on which sources the reports are 
based and what research methods have been employed by the PSC which compiled the 
report.74 Generally speaking, customers of PSCs, academics, the public and other observers 
have to be aware that by relying on summary reports from PSCs, one relies on selective 
information provided in many cases by the very companies that sell solutions to security 
threats. It is therefore important to bear in mind that PSCs are primarily commercial 
enterprises, aiming at producing financial profit for the company and its shareholders.  
Risk assessments conducted by PSCs also impact decision making-processes of key 
operators in the maritime industry such as insurance company underwriters. The findings and 
advice given by PSCs can, however, be controversial and their methods and overall aims 
criticised. The most prominent example is the decision by the Joint War Committee (JWC) – 
a body constituted of members of the Lloyds Market Association and the International 
Underwriting Association, which represents the interests of the London marine insurance 
community – to include the Malacca Straits in its ‘Hull War, Strikes, Terrorism and Related 
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Perils Listed Areas’ in 2005. In the past, such decisions have been based more on previous 
insurance losses.75 The JWC decision to include the Malacca Straits as a high-risk area, was, 
on the contrary, based on an assessment by Aegis Defence Services Ltd. a London-based PSC 
managed by its shareholders, among them, as Chairman and CEO, Lt-Col Tim Spicer.76 This 
new classification of the Malacca Straits impacts on the insurance premiums ship owners are 
required to pay when their vessels transit the straits, and, hence, has significant consequences 
for the maritime industry. Representatives of the shipping sector as well as regional 
governments consequently challenged the decision. The foreign ministers of Singapore, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, for example, asked the JWC to review its assessment and pointed out 
that the decision was made without consulting or taking into account the maritime security 
efforts of the three littoral states.77 Industry organizations, such as the International Chamber 
of Shipping, the Hong Kong Shipowners Association and the Singapore Shipping Association 
(SSA) raised concerns, arguing that there were flaws in the JWC’s decision and that the Aegis 
report did not sufficiently distinguish between different types of security threats, namely 
between piracy and terrorism. At a meeting between Aegis, the JWC and representatives of 
shipping organizations, the latter therefore “questioned the methodology employed by 
Aegis”.78 The SSA also criticized in a separate statement that the “decision appeared to have 
been taken on the findings of a single report from one commercial security organization” and 
added that they were prepared to provide the JWC with additional information regarding the 
state of security in the Malacca Straits.79 Furthermore, Mr. Mukundan, the director of the 
International Maritime Bureau, stated that: “[w]e do not feel that (the JWC decision) is 
justified. At this time, when the level of attacks are coming down, we don’t see (…) 
justifications to increase their rates. It may be appropriate when attacks were high but it is not 
anymore.”80 However, Lloyd’s reportedly removed the Malacca Straits from the list of sea 
lanes with a war risk rating about one year after it imposed the rating, stating that security in 
the strait had improved.81
In summary, PSCs play an increasingly important role in securing maritime Southeast 
Asia. However, the set-up, operations, and the nature of the services they offer can be 
controversial, particularly when performed by less reputable companies.     
 
PRIVATE VERSUS GOVERNMENT PROVIDED SECURITY – BETWEEN A ROCK 
AND…? (A CONCLUSION) 
Maritime security threats such as piracy, terrorism and the vulnerability of maritime 
installations including oil/gas platforms increase the demand for security initiatives in 
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Southeast Asia. As discussed above, security in the region is provided primarily by 
government forces, but increasingly private companies have offered their services. However, 
there are shortcomings, controversies and problems associated with security provided by both 
government forces and PSCs. With the exception of Singapore, law enforcement agencies in 
Southeast Asia often do not have sufficient personnel and modern equipment available to 
secure their waters, a task made difficult by the geographic features of the region. 
Additionally, corruption and the involvement of law enforcement and military personnel in 
illegal activities is a problem impacting on regional maritime security. Cooperation between 
government agencies in Southeast Asia and with countries from outside the region remains 
also limited, primarily because of concerns over sovereignty, rivalry among countries and a 
lack of resources. All these problems are not easily overcome. Countries such as Indonesia or 
the Philippines would need to invest heavily in their law enforcement agencies to provide 
sufficient resources and personnel to increase maritime security. As these countries are faced 
with more pressing internal problems, such as separatist and terrorist groups operating in 
these countries which primarily pose a security threat on land, as well as social issues such as 
poverty, such investment is not likely to be made in the near future.82 Given the limited 
government resources, corruption and the involvement of government officials in illegal 
activities will also most likely prevail. Furthermore, longstanding rivalry and distrust between 
countries and concerns over sovereignty issues will not easily vanish.     
Given these shortcomings the success of PMCs is understandable. The difficulties of 
ship or cargo owners, banks or insurance companies to deal effectively with local authorities 
in Southeast Asia (without paying bribes), and a lack of faith that the authorities will 
successfully handle the case and act in the victim’s interest, are incentives to hire a PSC. 
Indeed, the employment of a private company promises the use of highly experienced and 
motivated individuals, working solely in the client’s interest. Furthermore, over the past 
decades some companies operating mostly in the gas/oil or mining sector in Southeast Asia 
have paid local law enforcement agencies to guarantee the safety of their assets and 
employees. These payments to state security forces have resulted in a number of controversies 
and problems, including accusations of corruption and human rights abuses by the paid 
agencies.83 Unlike local forces, PSCs hired to protect foreign assets are generally not 
personally involved in internal conflicts in Southeast Asian states and may therefore not resort 
as readily to extreme forms of violence against local populations. Yet, there are a number of 
problems and controversial issues inherent in the private maritime security industry, and two 
conditions are required for such a scenario to work. First, oil/mining companies hiring PSCs 
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need to have a real interest in preventing human rights abuses and need to ensure that the PSC 
they employ conducts its work in a professional manner. Second, examples of PSCs accused 
of improper operations and human rights abuses from other parts of the world do exist, 
therefore oversight and clear regulation by external observers are necessary to prevent the 
misuse of force by PSC employees in maritime Southeast Asia. In fact, if the employment of 
PSCs in the maritime sector is to increase, then improved regulation and oversight of these 
companies is needed, especially because controversial PSC operations in places such as the 
Malacca Straits – where armed PSC employees guard vessels and energy installations – are 
already a reality. It would therefore be beneficial for Southeast Asian countries, which have 
not already done so, to address the issue directly and introduce and enforce clear guidelines, 
controls and permits for PSCs operating in their respective countries. The current system 
where PSCs employing armed personnel operate in some instances in an ambiguous zone, 
may allow less-reputable companies and insufficiently trained guards to also work in the 
region. This could have dire consequences for the people involved and create unnecessary 
problems for local governments.  
Given the problems associated with many local law enforcement agencies, and the 
increased demand for maritime security services, chances seem good that PSCs will prosper 
in Southeast Asia. However, if PSCs want to be an alternative or successful supplement to 
government agencies, companies must respect national and international laws, conduct their 
operations responsibly and be accountable for their activities. If governments in the region 
want to decrease the spread and influence of PSCs in Southeast Asia, they have to combat 
corruption within their forces, provide their personnel with sufficient equipment to secure 
their waters, overcome rivalries and increase operational cooperation beyond current multi- 
and bilateral arrangements.   
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